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Vision: Face-Centered Representations in the Brain 
 
Philippe G. Schyns 
 
A longstanding debate in the face recognition field concerns the format of face 
representations in the brain. New face research clarifies some of this mystery by revealing a 
face-centered format in a patient with a left splenium lesion of the corpus callosum who 
perceives the right side of faces as ‘melted’. 
 
The machinery that performs visual cognition humans is endowed with an unmatched range 
of capabilities supported by the most powerful of sensory systems. It routinely performs a 
variety of recognition tasks that all start with the projection of a stimulus onto the high-
dimensional retinal input with ~150 million rods and cones. A large proportion of cortex 
reduces this input into lower-dimensional representations that serve the key functions of 
visual perception and cognition. This reduction takes place within an architecture made of 
two hemispheres exchanging information via the corpus callosum. A key challenge remains 
to understand the format of these lower-dimensional representations and their contents, both 
in the brain and its models. In this issue of Current Biology, Almeida et al. [1] address the 
challenge in a study of patient A.D., who experiences a sudden and systematic perceptual 
distortion of the right side of faces — the right half of a face appears ‘melted’, in a similar 
manner to the melted clock on Dali’s famous painting — as a result of a left splenium lesion 
of his corpus callosum that hinders the exchange of information between the two 
hemispheres. 
The two hemispheres of the brain perform specialized cognitive functions and 
exchange outcomes via the corpus callosum to produce a unified cognition. Sperry and 
colleagues [2] famously showed that disruptions of communication in split-brain patients 
induced a strikingly dissociated cognition and conscious awareness — in these patients, the 
corpus callosum was sectioned to disable communication of epilepsy from its site of origin in 
one hemisphere to the other hemisphere. In patient A.D., a sudden lesion to the left splenium 
of the corpus callosum produced a striking effect, specifically of the perception of faces —
 technically referred to as contra-lateral hemi-prospmetamorphosia — whereby the right side 
of faces are perceived as melted: out of proportion, drooping or swollen, and not fitting with 
the left side. Though not explicitly understood as a section of the corpus callosum, A.D.’s 
splenium lesion is nevertheless important for understanding cognition because it dissociates 
perception of the left and right sides of faces. 
Almeida et al. [1] used this rare condition to adjudicate between three frames of 
reference as possible formats of A.D.’s face representations. A retino-centered format would 
represent the visual field, with A.D.’s perceptual distortions located only to the right side of 
his fixations. That is, a face projected to the left side of A.D.’s fixation would not appear 
distorted. A stimulus-centered format represents the image plane. Here, the right side of the 
two-dimensional image would be perceptually distorted, irrespective of whether the face 
within the image is right side up, or upside down. Finally, a face-centered format moves the 
reference frame to the three-dimensional space of the face itself. Perceived distortions would 
follow any rotation of the face, in the two-dimensional image plane or in three-dimensional 
depth. For example, a face rotated clockwise in the image plane would be perceived with a 
distortion on the right side of the face itself, irrespective of the rotation angle of the face (see 
Figure 1 in Almeida et al. [1]). 
This reasoning motivated the experimental work of Almeida et al. [1], which 
provided clear support for the face-centered format. That is, perceptual distortions on the 
right side of the face persisted even when an image was projected in the left and right visual 
fields either as full or as left and right split-halves faces, or rotated in the two-dimensional 
image plane or in three-dimensional depth to reveal only the profile or three-quarter view. 
Finally, the absence of distortions with other visual categories confirmed the specificity of 
the hemi-prospmetamorphosia to faces. The distorted contents primarily involve the right 
eye, the right side of the nose and the right corner of the lip, each reported as melting 
downwards, with less pronounced effects for faces that were not upright. Interestingly, even 
though faces have a level of bilateral symmetry that should enable the reconstruction of a full 
face from only a few views [3], in the case of A.D., bilateral symmetry does not appear to 
facilitate reconstruction of the distorted right side from the preserved left side (compare with 
visual filling-in mechanisms [4]). 
These results on A.D.’s hemi-prospmetamorphosia have far reaching implications for 
visual recognition research in the brain and its models (for example, deep networks), both for 
format of representations and their information contents. Starting with representation formats, 
we know that the left and right occipital cortices initially represent the contra-lateral 
hemifield with some overlap in areas V1 to V4 [5]. A face presented in the centre of the 
visual field is therefore representationally split on a vertical axis in the contra-lateral 
hemisphere (for example, with the left face side represented in the right hemisphere and vice 
versa). To integrate these split-half representations and produce a bilateral perception, A.D.’s 
hemispheres communicate via a lesioned corpus callosum. Almeida et al.’s [1] results 
suggest that the impaired architecture does construct a bilateral representation of the two face 
halves in the left and right pathways (see also [6]). Whether each comprises a face-centered 
distortion of the right face half remains an open question.  
The functional role of such face representations in the left and right hemispheres is 
unclear, when we know that the right hemisphere typically serves stimulus categorization [7] 
and perception [8,9]. Left and right versions could represent the stimulus for the specialized 
cognitive functions of the left and right hemispheres. To shed light on this, studies aiming for 
a finer granularity of face representation could reveal a specialization of information contents 
represented in each ventral pathway to support the specialized functions of each hemisphere. 
Further research, including modelling, should address where, when and how the 
communicating visual pathways transform initial representations in the occipital cortices 
(with contra-lateralized, retino-centric and mid-line split properties) into ventral 
representations (with bilateral, scale invariant and face-centered properties), that achieve the 
perceptual invariances demonstrated by A.D.. 
Having discussed how a face-centered format of representation could rely on two 
communicating hemispheres, we now turn to the distorted contents of A.D.’s face perception. 
There is a longstanding debate in the literature about whether face information contents are 
represented as wholes, or as combinations of features (reviewed in [10]). A.D.’s perceptions 
of right-distorted faces suggest at least the constraint of a midline split of contents related to 
the mis-communicating hemispheres, which in turn challenges the idea of faces represented 
as wholes. Verbal reports from AD further indicate that the distortions primarily concern 
discrete features (for example, the right eye, the right corner of the mouth), though these 
reports could simply reflect a verbalization bias to name face properties rather than evidence 
for featural representation per se. Objective studies of A.D.’s distortions — for example, with 
added noise reverse correlation (reviewed in [11]) or generative models tailored to the 
reported shapes of the distortions — could further document their specificity, in terms of the 
types of shapes, precise locations in face-centered coordinates, and interactions with face 
features [12]. Such a study would objectively assess whether A.D.’s distortions globally 
affect the full right half of the face, or primarily its component features and if so, how. 
A.D.’s case further raises the important question of the relationship between his 
distorted perception of faces and his memory of faces. To address this, one could task A.D. 
with predicting a face from memory when none is present in the input on any trial with only 
white noise templates shown as stimuli [13]. Following the experiment, reconstruction of the 
predicted face could reveal whether top-down cascading of the prediction from memory 
would incur right-sided distortions similar to the perception. An alternative would ask A.D. 
to report imagined faces, for example, at different rotations in depth, to analyse whether the 
top-down cascading of the visual prediction from memory into left and right V1-V4 
activations [14,15] comprises (in left V1-V4) distortions, or not. 
The new study of A.D.’s hemi-prospmetamorphosia with the ingenious designs of 
Almeida et al. [1] has revealed a face-centered format of face representation, involving an 
architecture split into two hemispheres, where initial contra-lateralized representations 
become later ‘stitched up’ into a unitary conscious perception that requires inter-hemispheric 
communication of information. These results suggest fundamental constrains on the 
architecture of recognition in the brain and its implementation in deep convolutional network 
models that should shape further research. 
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In Brief:  
A longstanding debate in the face recognition field concerns the format of face 
representations in the brain. New face research clarifies some of this mystery by revealing a 
face-centered format in a patient with a left splenium lesion of the corpus callosum who 
perceives the right side of faces as ‘melted’. 
 
